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JESSE JACKSON AND THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Harold A. McDougall*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite great strides by its middle class, black America today is plagued
by drugs, homelessness, AIDS, and murder and is at greatest risk from the fallout
of a crumbling environment. 1 The old Civil Rights Movement, which focused
on anti-discrimination law, is in need of replacement by a strategy which ena-
bles African-Americans to struggle over resources in the political arena. The
increase in voting in the African-American community, partly a function of the
Voting Rights Act and partly a function of the inspiration of Jesse Jackson, has
laid the foundation for such a development, as evidenced by the Black Caucus
and the Presidential campaign of Reverend Jackson himself. Ironically, the con-
frontational style of the old Civil Rights Movement remains one of its strong-
est legacies and needs to be revived as part of an overall strategy which includes
more genteel maneuvering in the halls of power.
II. FROM CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT TO CIVIL RiGHTS LAW
A. The Need for Community: Towards the 21st Century
The United States in today's international economy faces societies which
are more cohesive, better organized, and more productive. 2 The New Deal's
attempt to overcome governmental fragmentation through a fourth branch of
government (regulation) has fallen into disrepute.3 The progressive Democratic
coalition which supported the New Deal first lost the Presidency, then the Senate,
and then much of the federal bureaucracy. 4 The Democrats have regained the
Senate, but not the White House. Further, we see no headlong rush to reinstate
the New Deal, the New Frontier, or the Great Society. These have proven ex-
pensive to maintain and inadequate to coordinate law and society. I
With acceptable compromises in matters of economic approach and racial
* B.A., Harvard College, 1967; J.D., Yale Law School, 1971; Associate Professor and Director of the Clinical
Program in Law and Public Policy, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.
1. See generally NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1989 (1989) (research
papers published by the National Urban League, Jan. 24, 1989).
2. See Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH.
U.L. REV. 1 (1988).
3. See Shapiro, Apa Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 455 (1986).
4. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 457-61.
5. Id. at 455 (describing elements of New Deal consensus).
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interaction, our nation could begin the search for a higher level of community
to better integrate our people and make our economy more competitive. 6 Under
present social and economic conditions, integration of individual and commu-
nity at the national level would be very difficult. 7 We can begin with small-
scale efforts, however, as laboratories in which new ways of creating self and
community can be explored and out of which models of more general applica-
tion can be created. 8
Lawyers and political professionals are not the primary actors in these small
experiments. There is a price involved in resorting to the state and the profes-
sionals who operate it as a way of resolving community problems. 9 When dia-
logue is limited to professionals, 10 strategy is inordinately conceived "according
to the conventions of the legal world."11 To the extent the dialogue only includes
actors in the legal profession, resort to authoritativeness rather than persuasion
is made more likely. 
12
Further, resort to the state apparatus requires the acceptance of a principle
for organizing community which is "itself incapable of producing . . . norma-
tive meaning."13 Thus, the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s some-
how lost momentum- and, strangely, legitimacy - when they abandoned their
tactics of social action in favor of a "piece of the action" - clout in the political-
legal system. The Civil Rights Movement provides the most familiar and com-
pelling example.
6. See generally S.PECK, THE DIFFERENT DRUM: COMMUNITY MAKING AND PEACE (1987) (arguing
for a transition from individualism to community as a worthy goal of both community and individual de-
velopment).
7. See Michelman, Law's Republic 6 (1988) (unpublished manuscript) ("jurisgenerative politics" re-
quires a normative component that may not serve the inclusion of widely divergent experiences and outlooks
in the community); id. at 15 (nationally organized, popular political mobilization "must forever be rare").
8. See M.CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTs 280 (1985). See also Fiss, Conventionalism, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 193-94 (1985) (challenging Critical Legal Studies to articulate such a method of mak-
ing social choices).
9. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15-16 (1983). An early example
is the compromise over slavery built into the Constitution. Jefferson, himself a slaveowner, was so intensely
in favor of the ideals of the Revolution that he felt slavery was incompatible with them; and the early drafts
of the Declaration of Independence contained ringing denunciations of slavery. These were eliminated, however,
and the Constitution itself permitted the slave trade to continue openly until 1808. See D. BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED 28 (1987). But see Fiss, supra note 8, at 183 ("Constitution embodies a public morality,
including a commitment to racial equality.").
10. See Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48
U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 722 (1987) (citing 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); 0. Fiss, INJUNC-
TIONS ch. 3 (1973); 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS ch. 9 (2d ed. 1984)).
11. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 10, at 725. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Pub-
lic Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 912 (1987) (Congress should limit interest group stranglehold on policymaking
through legislation, such as limiting PAC contributions to campaign financing.). See also id. at 920 (Courts
may be able to insure sound public policy by insisting that legislatures follow established procedures as in
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).).
12. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 757 (1982).
13. Cover, supra note 9, at 16.
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B. The Turn to Legalisms in the Civil Rights Movement
The use of law in the Civil Rights Movement has changed dramatically
since the civil disobedience campaigns of the late 1950s and early 1960s. At
the outset the Civil Rights Movement was driven by a spontaneous combustion
made possible by the closely-knit nature of the segregated black community.
Civil rights workers generally defied the law rather than using it as an instru-
ment of social change, despite the landmark Brown v. Board of Education
decision. 14
To the extent law was used, it served as an adjunct to an overall strategy
of ideological warfare. Legal doctrine and advocacy were placed at the service
of "utopian and messianic yearnings, imaginary shapes [were] given to a less
resistant reality" and "critiques [were] leveled at the justificatory enterprises
of [the] law." 15 Norms such as equality and nondiscrimination were publicly
articulated through litigation, providing a basis for a continuing dialogue in the
civil community which strengthened and extended the bonds of common aware-
ness which were being generated in the smaller community of civil rights workers
and other movement participants.
The Civil Rights Movement relinquished some of its larger egalitarian goals,
however, so that more modest goals could be pursued within the framework
of legislation. After the major civil rights bills of the 1960s were passed-The
Civil Rights Act of 1964,16 The Voting Rights Act of 1965,17 and the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 18-the law was on the side of civil rights. The civil rights
lawyers and other professionals who came to Washington to guard this legisla-
tion the Movement had achieved by pressure at the street level "became" the
Civil Rights Movement. 19
The Civil Rights Movement thus spun off a large community of leaders,
lawyers, and other professionals who agreed on certain basic assumptions about
society and the role of the moral individual in society. This community today
is called the "Leadership Conference on Civil Rights." Interestingly, many of
the participants in the Leadership Conference still have a "Movement" style and
identification. They practice by "networking" as well as by litigation, legisla-
tion, and regulation. The network they have created connects the public and
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. Cover, supra note 9, at 9.
16. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended as 28 U.S.C. § 1447; 42 U.S.C.
33 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
17. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973p
(1982 & Supp. 1988).
18. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1982 &
Supp. 1988).
19. See Clune, A Political Model of Implementation and Implications of the Model for Public Policy,
Research, and the Changing Roles of Law and Lawyers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 47 (1983) for discussion of the
various professional roles available to "civil rights lawyers" at 114-17 & nn. 175-79 (law prophets) and at
116 n. 175 (" 'second generation' administrative law reformers").
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the three branches of government through dialogue in the civil rights area. Civil
rights lawyers participating in the Leadership Conference today build consen-
sus as well as manipulate the rule-based system, creating a web of relation-
ships which has become as important as legal rules themselves in creating and
effecting policy. 
2 0
The Leadership Conference's consensus-building process includes a good
deal of education and outreach. The Conference thus touches a much larger
group of lay people at its periphery who endorse the values first articulated
by the Civil Rights Movement. Some of these people were strongly stirred by
the Civil Rights Movement itself, through participation or confrontation in the
1960s. Others have been involved in the more recent efforts to extend or amend
the basic civil rights legislation of the 1960s. Many of these lay persons at the
periphery of the Conference adhere to the Movement's basic principles of ra-
cial and gender equality and freedom from government interference in private life.
With a core of lawyers and other professionals linked to a larger sympathetic
group in the civil community, the Leadership Conference handed President Rea-
gan his three greatest domestic policy defeats during his two terms in office -
the 1982 extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, The Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act of 1987, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. 21 The Con-
ference has thus matured to considerable influence. 22
There is a limit, however, to the depth of contact which can be achieved
through legislation alone. The issue becomes one of securing adherence to
established rules, rather than seeking to alter behavior through conversation,
confrontation, and the force of example. Where the Civil Rights Movement
was a conversation which sought to engage the entire nation in dialogue, its
law and policymaking offshoot engages in conversations which bind interest
groups and institutional actors together, sometimes excluding, rather than in-
cluding others. 2 3 Legal "corpus, discourse, and interpersonal commitment" have
melded together into a new kind of legal culture, one which has one foot in
the redemptive community of the Civil Rights Movement (or similar movements)
and the other in the highly charged, awesome power of the national government .
24
20. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 10, at 705-06.
21. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973b, 1973aa-la, 1973aa-6 (Supp.
1988); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1988); Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988).
22. On this process see Clune, supra note 19, at 68-70. Professor Kingdon calls these "policy communi-
ties." J. KINGDON, AGENDA, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 123-28 (1984) (detailed discussion of
the operation and composition of such communities).
23. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 10, at 717; see also id. at 718-19.
24. Cover, supra note 9, at 12. Dr. Charles Hamilton observes that political (i.e., electoral) participa-
tion must be supplemented by the ability to affect public attitudes (through social movement tactics and use
of the media) and the ability to effect the implementation of public policy. See NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE,
supra note I.
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Ill. THE CIVIL COMMUNITY, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Instead of movements led by lawyers, a wide variety of ordinary citizens
must grapple with issues of civil rights, peace, women's rights, and the environ-
ment at the street level, using dialogue and nonviolent confrontation as a means
to further humanize both themselves and their opponents .2 5 This dialogue, both
quiet and strident, must take place in communities all over the country.
26
The analogy is to "committee of the whole" in which issues are debated but
no legislative action can be taken. 27
To expand the scope of these small conversations, outreach needs to be
carried on in schools, colleges, work settings, and communities. 28 The lan-
guage and terms of the discussion need to be accessible to the general popula-
tion and not so rarified as to make public policy, in real terms, a matter for
the elite alone. 29 During the American Revolution, such outreach took place
in the form of plays, songs, and didactic literature on republican virtues. Poli-
tical satire and epic poetry were found in abundance. Each of the 100 newspapers
existing in the colonies published the full text of the proposed Constitution for
discussion and debate which took place in school, church, and tavern. 30 Dia-
logue and open discussion is the key to the process . 3' Neither Congress nor
a constitutional convention could fully contain such a dialogue. Similarly, legal
rules, whether of common-law or statutory origin, may be insufficient for the
task of building community. 32 A glimpse of this process was available during
the recent presidential elections in the political campaign of Jesse Jackson.
25. Singer refers to this process as the "'joint reconstruction of social life.'" Singer, The Player and
the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 66 (1984) (quoting Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy
in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1386 (1984)). See also R. HATCH, BEYOND OPPORTUNITY: JESSE
JACKSON'S VISION FOR AMERICA 82-85, 86-90 (1988).
26. The outcome of such struggles is not always positive (viz., Howard Beach and the Brawley situa-
tion). See Michelman, supra note 7, at 18 & n. 132.
27. Compare Michelman, supra note 7, at 20 (notion of republican dialogue not exclusively . . . tied
to the coercive exercise of centralized majoritarian power); and at n.29 (quoting Benhabib on the notion
of public decisions being made by reasonably "autonomous citizens in a process of unconstrained exchange
of opinions").
28. See W. Kaplin, The Process of Constitutional Interpretation: Roles for Lawyers and Significant Others
24 (1987) (unpublished manuscript).
29. See W. Kaplin, supra note 28, at 24. See also Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV.
765, 772 (1982) (law is a" 'mysterious science' . . . inaccessible to laypersons"). The Roosevelt Center for
Public Policy (dedicated to the public policy tenets of all three Roosevelts -Theodore, Franklin, and Eleanor)
has done some extraordinary work developing simulations on such issues as budget-balancing, national defense,
and the like, for use by citizen's groups in outreach on public policy issues. See also Michelman, supra
note 7, at 18 (freedom including the self-intrusion and self-evaluation made possible by dialogue, reordering
the lives and experiences of others by considering their perspectives).
30. M. Bloomfield, Constitutional Values and the Literature of the Early Republic 4 (1988) (unpublished
manuscript). This is one of the reasons it is so difficult to identify the "framers" of the Constitution. Id.
31. Cf M. KING, JR. STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM 223 (1958).
32. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1385-86 (1984) ("Modest
realists" should think of the world not as comprised of rules and structure but of human interaction which
is both necessary and threatening and which must be constantly subject to reconstruction and revision.). See
also Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 5 Miss. C. L. REV. 1 (1984). Cf. Farber & Frickey, supra note 11, at 912, 920.
19881
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
A. The Jackson Phenomenon33
The politics of inclusion practiced by Jesse L. Jackson are a good indica-
tion of how broad a community can become even (or especially) with a focus
on the political-legal system .34  Seven million Americans of a wide range of
class and ethnic backgrounds and ages voted for the Reverend Jackson in the
1988 Democratic primaries. Jackson brought 1,200 delegates to the Convention.
The "Rainbow" Movement of Reverend Jackson is the heir to the Missis-
sippi Freedom Democratic Party ("MFDP") of Fanny Lou Hamer and Ella Baker,
returning in triumph in 1988 to the Democratic Convention which ostracized
MFDP in 1964, offering to seat only two of their delegates. 3
The history of the MFDP is a history of both the Civil Rights Movement
and the Democratic Party. 36 In 1964 blacks constituted 2.8% of the delegates
to the Democratic Convention .3 7 In 1988, 23 % were black, for a total of 962
delegates. 3  In 1964, a 64-member, integrated delegation called the Missis-
sippi Freedom Democratic Party challenged the credentials of the all-white dele-
gation of the state's regular Democratic Party. 39 Only two members of the
delegation were allowed to be seated, and the two, Fanny Lou Hamer and Aa-
ron Henry, refused. 40 In 1968, Julian Bond led an integrated delegation from
Georgia to challenge the all-white delegation led by Governor Lester Maddox.
Half of Bond's delegation was seated, half of Maddox's. 41 In 1972, Jesse Jack-
son challenged the Illinois delegation led by Mayor Richard Daley and won,
unseating the entire Daley delegation.4 2 These challenges also led to a more
open delegate selection process from which Jackson and others ultimately
benefited.
The MFDP only aimed to integrate the Mississippi delegation to the Con-
33. For a very incisive view of Reverend Jackson and the implications of his style for the future of American
politics, see R. HATCH, supra note 25, at 37-43 (nexus of religious and political resources for purposes of
social transformation).
34. Jackson, as the "first black candidate to contend seriously for a major party political nomination"
invoked his "rise from poverty as a symbol of hope for poor and working-class Americans (as well)." Benenson,
From Day One, Unity is the Convention Theme, CONG. Q., July 23, 1988, at 2025.
35. In his Democratic Convention speech, Jackson invoked the heroes of the Civil Rights Movement
and introduced Rosa Parks, "heroine of the 1955 Montgomery, Ala. bus boycott." And some fence-mending
within the Movement was evidenced when, on Wednesday, Coretta Scott King declared that her late hus-
band would be "proud" of Reverend Jackson and of "the way [Jackson] broadened political participation in
America." Benenson, supra note 34, at 2027. He observed that "Fanny Lou Hamer didn't have the most
votes in Atlantic City, but her principles have outlasted every delegate who voted to lock her out." Text
of Jackson's July 19, 1988, address to Democratic National Convention, reprinted in CONG. Q., July 23,
1988, at 2057, 2060.
36. See Maraniss, Blacks and the Long Road to Atlanta, Wash. Post, July 18, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
37. id. at AI, col. 5.
38. Id. at Al, col. 4-5.
39. Id. at Al, A20, col. I.
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vention. The Rainbow Coalition, however, aims to become the left wing of the
Democratic Party. 1 3 As such, the Rainbow Coalition presents an interesting
interface between law (and politics) and community. The fervor of the Rain-
bow Movement called for an uncompromising position vis-a-vis the Democratic
candidate for President and the Democratic Platform Committee. At the same
time, a large number of those who voted for Jackson did so because they agreed
with his programmatic focus and were not simply swayed by charisma. Com-
promises were called for if the Rainbow Movement was to become the party's
left wing. 4
The realization that compromise was necessary, however, was only the first
step of the elaborate dance between Jackson and Dukakis, between the Rain-
bow Movement and the Democratic Party. Preliminary talks after the New York
primary left Jackson forces convinced that Dukakis and his staff were not tak-
ing them seriously and were insufficiently respectful of the electoral ground
they had gained."5 Under these circumstances, Jackson forces resorted to "move-
ment" techniques such as the much-publicized bus caravan along the route of
Sherman's March to Georgia as a way of building pressure for more satisfacto-
ry negotiations.46 The bus caravan was but one example of the Jackson phenome-
na which confused and worried party regulars-a "movement within a
campaign -a unique phenomenon in U.S. politics.
" *
4
At the same time, certain realities of electoral politics placed restraints upon
what tactics could be used. Jackson, during the primaries and during the Con-
vention, walked a tightrope between movement excess and electoral co-optation.48
Dukakis, in turn, tried to avoid the appearance of capitulation to "movement"
excess while at the same time not appearing to co-opt Jackson.49
Political compromise unsettled social movement people in 1988, just as
43. The Democratic campaign platform showed Jackson's influence in foreign policy (policies against
apartheid and Contra aid), defense and domestic spending (higher spending for prenatal care, nutrition pro-
grams for pregnant women and infants, the headstart program, education, and a comprehensive national
health care program). Elving, Plorn Compromise Yields Benefits, Risks, CONG. Q., July 23, 1988, at 2011.
44. Jackson's compromises and his emergence as a "team player" signaled a victory of "pragmatism over
idealism." For the first time since 1968 the "issue oriented activists who dominated the Democratic nominat-
ing process . . . subordinated their agendas to the goal of party victory." Benenson, supra note 34, at 2023.
45. Gilliam, Jackson Plays It Right, Wash. Post, July 18, 1988, at D3, col. 4.
46. See Ifill, Letter from the Jackson Caravan: Images Aplenty Along the Road From Chicago to Atlan-
ta, Wash. Post, July 17, 1988, at A29, col. 1.
47. Gilliam, supra note 45, at D3, col. 4.
48. As one of Jackson's delegates put it during the convention, "Rather than protest, we have to iron
out our differences and not make a scene" (Frances Bright Johnson, a union delegate from Savannah, Geor-
gia). Taylor, Dukakis Arrives to Claim Nomination, Wash. Post, July 18, 1988, at Al, A19, col. 4.
49. Dukakis was urged by his staff "to walk a line between not appearing to go overboard to accommo-
date Jackson, and not appearing to be ungracious to him or his constituency." Taylor, Jackson Tones Down
Rhetoric, Speaks of Healing and Unity, Wash. Post, July 16, 1988, at Al, col. 3. Negotiations involved
a plane and resources for campaigning and voter registration as well as spots on the Democratic National
Committee, Dukakis's transition team, and the Dukakis Administration, should there be one. Taylor, supra,
at A6, col. 2-3. Electoral bargaining chips Jackson had in hand were the threat to challenge Bentsen as Vice
President and stage a floor fight over the Democratic Party platform.
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it did in 1964 (when it led to a sit-in and walk-out). 
50 Compromise has no
place in a social movement.
Losers become martyrs in a crusade. Victory is achieved only when the crusade
takes total control. Negotiations and deals, the stuff of American politics, are
seen as condescending tokens by crusaders. That's why the compromises Dukakis
[offered were at first] ignored by Jackson's crusaders. Their only goal [was] total
victory. 51
In 1988, however, it was clear that the party needed the Rainbow Coalition,
not just at the Convention but in getting out the vote and winning the election. 
52
In fact, the spectacle of Dukakis and Bentsen "dicker[ing] over how [Jackson]
would be rewarded for staying within the party unsettled party regulars as much
as Jackson's 'crusaders."'
53
Jackson's "movement" people were urged at the end of the Convention to
throw themselves into the electoral process. 5 4 Persuading Jackson's support-
ers to vote even though Jackson was not on the ticket became "the responsibili-
ty of leadership." 55 But the primary "electoral" victory had already been won -to
avoid a repeat of the violent, fratricidal confrontations of the 1968 Conven-
tion. 5 6 Despite an embarrassing flub when Lloyd Bentsen was selected for Vice
Presidential running mate and Jackson was not properly notified, Dukakis did
an admirable job of bringing Jackson and his forces into the fold. Unfortunate-
ly, it was all downhill thereafter as Dukakis during the convention tried vainly
to capture the moderate and conservative vote by moving Jackson from center
stage.
B. Civil Rights and National Politics
Despite the eventual disappointments of the 1988 presidential race, the dance
between the Civil Rights Movement and the political process will continue for
the foreseeable future. 17 Jackson, and others such as Lloyd Bentsen, might
begin to play the role of The Loyal Opposition, a phenomenon ensconced in
50. A painful moment came when Jackson assembled his 1,200 delegates in his hotel to tell them that
he would not be on the ticket. Maraniss, Jackson's Road to Acceptance, Wash. Post, July 24, 1988, at A 1,,
A19, col. 4.
51. Williams, Waiting for the Jackson Reaction, Wash. Post, July 17, 1988, at C1, C4, col. 3.
52. Dukakis "had to recruit [Jackson] and his movement to the Convention and the Fall campaign." See
Elving, Marching From Atlanta, Their Eyes on the Prize, CONG. Q., July 23, 1988, at 2007, 2010.
53. Dukakis was careful to maintain that "[tihere's no deal . . .no fine print .... It's a matter of respecting
each other, understanding what we stand for, having that common ground that Reverend Jackson talked
about . . . ." CONG. Q., July 23, 1988, at 2064 (text of Dukakis-Jackson-Bentsen July 18, 1988, press con-
ference). See also Broder, Dukakis-Jackson Talk Ushers in Harmony as Convention Opens, Wash. Post,
July 19, 1988, at AI, col. 4.
54. Gilliam, After the Unity, Healing, Wash. Post, July 25, 1988, at D3, col. 4.
55. Id. (quoting Mayor Thomas Barnes of Gary, Indiana).
56. Bradley, Were Those Democrats in Atlanta?, Wash. Post, at Cl, C2, col. 4.
57. Broder & Ifill, Jackson Seeks Major Role, Wash. Post, July 17, 1988, at Al, A31, Col. 3-6.
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European politics but so sorely needed - and missing - in the United States. The
role of the Opposition is to point out the mistakes of the incumbent-for all
four years of the administration, not in a flurry of rhetoric during the election
year.
A key question as we look forward to 1992 is the level upon which the
racial issue will be hauled into national campaigns. Will politicians and the media,
especially, use the "Jackson" issue to educate, to lead the country toward a higher
level of integration, or will they pander to the racism of "Joe Six-Pack"? 8
Will liberal features of Democratic policies be labeled "Jackson" policies? s
Clearly, Dukakis during the national elections failed to play his strong suit,
conducting an overly sanitized version of the politics of inclusion, drastically
underutilizing Jackson's energy and talent. 60 Reverend Jackson will no doubt
always keep one foot in the "Movement" and one in the electoral arena; however,
the tension between the two may create problems for him, but it will also create
unique opportunities as well.
Jackson has not been fully transformed from a "movement" leader to a po-
litical leader and perhaps will always straddle the fence. Jackson spoke of his
constituency as accompanying him in the great hall as his name was put in nomi-
nation for the presidency; people with great hopes and ambitions, whose chil-
dren are on drugs and their grandchildren raised in broken homes. 6 Partly
because of the nature of this constituency, he will always need to have resort
to "movement techniques" as well as electoral and political ones. 62 He has liter-
ally, as well as figuratively, not left these people behind. For Jackson, this dual
process is not only political, "in terms of votes," but also "sociological in terms
of transforming people .... , 63 We can thus expect him to continue to "[m]ake
it tense, but not ugly . . . [because] [f]rom creative tension, new life comes." 4
IV. THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Our national culture seems to have been at sea since John F. Kennedy was
58. If Dukakis "[allows Jackson to jerk him aroundi there are a lot of Joe Six-packs around the country
who are going to say [he's] kissing Jesse's 'rearend' . . ." Taylor, supra note 49, at Al, A6, col. 1 (quoting
a "top Democratic campaign operative, who asked not to be identified").
59. Elving, supra note 51, at 2010.
60. Benenson, supra note 34, at 2024.
61. Harris, On Atlanta's Street of Dreams, Wash. Post., July 21, 1988, at BI, Bl, Col. 4. The Civil
Rights Movement removed barriers to equal opportunity-in the franchise, public accommodations, hous-
ing, and education. But there is a way in which class and race have interacted to place lower-class blacks
in-a particularly intractable position. Ironically, this has occurred while the black middle class has made
visible progress. See Thompson, Atlanta's Unequal Prosperity, Wash. Post, July 18, 1988, at A17.
62. Maraniss, supra note 50 at Al, A19, col. I.
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assassinated. 65 Perhaps after Kennedy's death we lost our sense of the future,
which is why it has become increasingly difficult to muster the political will
to provide for education, infrastructure, or the environment. We continue to
search for a hero to lead us out of our condition and for a scapegoat to blame it on.
The way to create public values is through social movements of many differ-
ent kinds -environmental, women's, civil rights, and so forth. Empowered people
don't need to look for external solutions. At the same time, empowerment re-
quires external change as well as internal rebirth.66 We thus need social move-
ments to alter external reality, particularly social institutions. Internal rebirth,
however, means that we all must accept the consequences of the historic choices
which make America what she is, because we all benefit from, as well as are
harmed by, those choices.67 Even more, we must learn to accept the conse-
quences of the choices we ourselves have made. 66
The new Civil Rights Movement precipitated by Jesse Jackson's campaigns
for the Presidency and by the work of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
uses the electoral system, legislation, litigation, administrative rulemaking, con-
versation, and confrontation to focus the attention of the civil community on
important issues of poverty, disease, and environmental pollution as well as
the continuing denial of civil rights to many of our people.
"The media"- newspapers, magazines, news organizations, television
networks -are the New Civil Rights Movement's chief obstacle and potential
ally for the development of belief systems which could undergird a higher lev-
el of community in our society. 69 Both the media and the Movement engage
the civil community in conversation. Law, politics, and telecommunications
can shape dialogue, but only dialogue can build community. '0
Electoral strategies and movement strategies will have to be combined to
address the serious social problems we face. The New Civil Rights Movement,
operating in legal and political as well as private and community arenas, might
65 Popular participation in American presidential elections has been steadily declining for the past 25
years. NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 1. The demise of the Civil Rights Movement has also con-
tributed to the national culture's lack of direction. The Civil Rights Movement provided much of the ethical
and moral focus of the country and led the country in a way that only members of an oppressed group could.
Compare the present women's movement, which Professor Fiss sees as providing a new source of public
values. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15 (1986).
66. R. HATCH, supra note 25, at 82-85.
67. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) holds that affirmative action programs
cannot be justified unless there is evidence of prior discrimination. If public officials, accepting the conse-
quences of our historic choices, would simply make a public admission that discrimination had taken place
in the past, this would answer all of the Court's questions.
68. M. KING, JR., supra note 31, at 223.("We must not let the fact that we are victims of injustice lull
us into abrogating responsibility for our own lives.").
69. D.A. GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLITICS 163-64 (3d ed. 1989) (Media's "agenda-setting"
function).
70. In this sense we straddle the contradiction between law as alienated from the subjective self and the
need for dedication to law in a way that we typically reserve for subjects, but not objects. Cf Cover, supra
note 9, at 45.
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take the civil community to "a point beyond labels (like conservative and liber-
al)- . . the point of common ground and common survival
[which] . . . transcend[s] race, sex, and religion."71
Future electoral strategies could include Jackson working for the Rainbow
Coalition in state and local elections, in 1990 reapportionment battles, and in
a Keep Hope Alive political action committee designed to aid progressive po-
litical candidates .7 2 (He could also run for President every four years until the
year 2000.73) Future movement strategies might involve building a mass base
for progressive policies which can root development deep into disadvantaged
communities with institution-building and public-private partnerships. As Jesse
Jackson has said, "yesterday's protest is today's politics."17 Jackson may have
chosen for himself the catalytic role of transforming protest into politics and
appears willing to pay the price of living in the purgatory between social move-
ment and electoral politics.
71. Jesse Jackson (July 18, 1988, press conference) reprinted in CONG. Q., July 23, 1988, at 2065.
72. Note, for example, Jackson's participation in the 1989 campaign for Mayor of Chicago. Peterson,
Jackson on the Defensive, Wash. Post, Mar. 30, 1989, at Al, col. 5. The developments in Chicago indicate
that Jackson is still attempting to balance protest and politics.
73. Jackson's conflicts with the National Democratic Party, and the Illinois Democratic Party, over the
Chicago mayoral campaign signal his unwillingness to become a political candidate or party regular at the
expense of sacrificing his social movement ties. A more likely political candidate appears to be Ron Brown,
the new Democratic Party Chairman. Brown, according to Professor Martin Kilson of Harvard University,
represents a more acceptable inside image than Jackson in the same way that John Kennedy projected a more
acceptable inside image of Irish politics than did the more flamboyant Michael Curley, former Mayor of Boston.
74. Maraniss, supra note 50, at A20, col. 2.
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